Fiona & Friends #1 - Da hipocrisia moral (by uniusburiuni)
Inicio aqui um novo capítulo neste blog. Como sabem, one-girl-blog. Daí que fiz convites a algumas pessoas, significant others, para deixarem cá o seu contributo.
O primeiro é da minha guru, vasta e transversalmente mencionada, referida, até citada por terras da neoplasia existencial.
A uniusburiuni escolheu falar sobre a hiprocrisia moral.
«How can people appear moral to themselves when fail to act morally?
The benefits to oneself of moral hypocrisy are obvious: one can reap the material rewards of acting selfishly and also garner the social and self-rewards of being seen and seeing oneself as upstanding and moral.” “Only when the appearance-reality link is unambiguous should moral hypocrisy produce a moral result.” “If one is to gain the self-rewards for being moral and, more important perhaps, to avoid the self-punishements for being a hypocrite, then one must appear moral to oneself.”
Não se trata de auto-engano, no sentido de Gur e Sackheim (1979), em que a pessoa mantém simultaneamente duas crenças contraditórias mas não está consciente de uma, nem de Demos (1960), em que a pessoa acredita no que em outro nível ele sabe que não é assim. É pior: “The goal of moral hypocrisy can be reached if one can manipulate the data so as to avoid confronting the discrepancy between one’s self-serving behavior and one’s moral standards. How can one manipulate the data to avoid this discrepancy?
A questão, então, é: como?
Assuming that (a) one has behaved in a way that violates his or her moral standards and (b) responsibility for the behavior cannot be denied or justified, ordinary self-deception strategies that would serve moral hypocrisy can be classified as one of two types. First, one could perceive the behavior as moral (i.e., as being in line with his or her moral standards), even though it actually is not. Isto é muito bom. Podemos ter um determinado comportamento, auto ou hetero-censurável, e ainda assim acreditar que temos um código moral aceitável.
Second, one could avoid comparing the behavior with his or her moral standards. Ou seja, formação reactiva e negação.
The first of these two strategies, if available, seems preferable because the second leaves one vulnerable to anything that might focus attention on the behavior-standard discrepancy. Por outras palavras, ficamos mais vulneráveis, à mercê de uma qualquer pessoazinha chegue e nos confronte com as nossas próprias inconsistências.
If a person can convince himself or herself that he or she has acted morally, then the behavior can be scrutinized from the perspective of his or her standards with impunity, even pride.
O primeiro é da minha guru, vasta e transversalmente mencionada, referida, até citada por terras da neoplasia existencial.
A uniusburiuni escolheu falar sobre a hiprocrisia moral.
«How can people appear moral to themselves when fail to act morally?
The benefits to oneself of moral hypocrisy are obvious: one can reap the material rewards of acting selfishly and also garner the social and self-rewards of being seen and seeing oneself as upstanding and moral.” “Only when the appearance-reality link is unambiguous should moral hypocrisy produce a moral result.” “If one is to gain the self-rewards for being moral and, more important perhaps, to avoid the self-punishements for being a hypocrite, then one must appear moral to oneself.”
Não se trata de auto-engano, no sentido de Gur e Sackheim (1979), em que a pessoa mantém simultaneamente duas crenças contraditórias mas não está consciente de uma, nem de Demos (1960), em que a pessoa acredita no que em outro nível ele sabe que não é assim. É pior: “The goal of moral hypocrisy can be reached if one can manipulate the data so as to avoid confronting the discrepancy between one’s self-serving behavior and one’s moral standards. How can one manipulate the data to avoid this discrepancy?
A questão, então, é: como?
Assuming that (a) one has behaved in a way that violates his or her moral standards and (b) responsibility for the behavior cannot be denied or justified, ordinary self-deception strategies that would serve moral hypocrisy can be classified as one of two types. First, one could perceive the behavior as moral (i.e., as being in line with his or her moral standards), even though it actually is not. Isto é muito bom. Podemos ter um determinado comportamento, auto ou hetero-censurável, e ainda assim acreditar que temos um código moral aceitável.
Second, one could avoid comparing the behavior with his or her moral standards. Ou seja, formação reactiva e negação.
The first of these two strategies, if available, seems preferable because the second leaves one vulnerable to anything that might focus attention on the behavior-standard discrepancy. Por outras palavras, ficamos mais vulneráveis, à mercê de uma qualquer pessoazinha chegue e nos confronte com as nossas próprias inconsistências.
If a person can convince himself or herself that he or she has acted morally, then the behavior can be scrutinized from the perspective of his or her standards with impunity, even pride.
Em suma, por muito que se tenda a responsabilizar o inconsciente quer pela validação de actos (i)morais, minimizando o papel do coitadinho do sujeito, na verdade há uma forma sustentada psicologicamente, que é o ofectuar os comportamentos tidos como "imorais" e, num exercício de contorcionismo mental, auto-validar-se e ainda se sair com um rasgo de “i do it and i do it with pride”.»
by uniusburiuni
The original soundtrack for this post is: Born to darkness - Part I (Interview with the vampire OST)
posted by fiona bacana at 4:02 AM
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